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21 Introduction
When exchanges in India shifted from open outcry to the anonymous elec-
tronic limit order book, a tremendous improvement in ﬁnancial market out-
comes was obtained. Price discovery became more eﬃcient. Market volatility
showed less persistence and liquidity became more resilient, even when faced
with large news events. However, these improvements have not been sym-
metric across all securities and across all times. Many ﬁnancial products
are illiquid on the order book market, including in the equity spot market,
several derivatives series and most bonds. Even for liquid stocks where con-
tinuous trading generally works well, good liquidity and low volatility are not
consistent throughout the trading day.
The call auction is an alternative to continuous trading with an anonymous
limit order book, which keeps the anonymous limit order book, but dispenses
with continuous order matching. In a call auction, orders arrive continuously
into the auction order book but remains unexecuted till the end of the auction
period when the orders get matched into trades. Until then however, the
system displays a market clearing “provisional price”, and allows for orders
to be revised or removed.
Why are call auctions interesting? The ﬁrst issue is the improved price
eﬃciency obtained through temporal aggregation of the order ﬂow. In a
continuous market, the price is made by moment-to-moment ﬂuctuations in
the order ﬂow. In the call auction, a large number of orders are put together
to yield a single market clearing price.
The second issue is that of risk from the viewpoint of traders with large
orders that tend to have high price impact in continuous markets. When
a large order is placed on a call auction, there is no immediate execution.
Instead, the auction displays a diﬀerent provisional price and gives time for
responses from the other side. In an auction, there is a certainty of having
no impact cost or being vulnerable to front-running. Large orders tend to be
absorbed better using call auctions.
One example of where the aggregation of orderﬂow in a call auction can
deliver better market outcomes is the problem of the start of trading. There
is potentially a large change in the price from the previous days close to the
opening price of the morning. In India, this opening price discovery takes as
3much as 35 minutes. If, instead, a call auction were held for (say) 10 minutes,
it could create a more eﬃcient opening price, after which continuous trading
could commence.
There is a good deal of international experience with call auctions. At several
exchanges, the NYSE being one of them, the opening price is computed
using a call auction. At LSE, a call auction is used at the close of trading to
discover the spot market closing price, and to support closeout by derivatives
arbitrageurs. Call auctions had long been used as the main market design in
continental Europe, particularly for illiquid stocks, the best known example
of which was the Paris Stock Exchange. The Taiwan Stock Exchange uses
periodic call auctions to trade stocks. India stands out, as a country with
big exchanges, where call auctions are not used.
There are four important potential areas where call auctions could be applied
in India. The ﬁrst is the problem of discovering an opening price, so as to
impound overnight news into the price more eﬃciently than with the existing
continuous market. The second is for a closing price: it would be useful to
get a sharp and well-trusted price, and to give all traders a zero-impact-cost
mechanism to closeout positions for the day. The third is as a primary trading
mechanism for illiquid securities, where periodic call auction (say every hour)
could work better than illiquid continuous trading. Finally, call auctions
could replace the existing system of ‘circuit breakers’. Instead of halting the
market when large price changes take place, the continuous market could be
replaced brieﬂy with a call auction, which would discover a new price, after
which continuous trading could recommence.
The key constraint of call auctions lies in the free rider problem. Every
trader likes to see the provisional price of a call auction, but traders do not
have an incentive to reveal their own information until the very end, when
the call auction is about to end. A series of design ideas have been found,
which attack this problem. In this paper, we discuss ﬁve of these design
parameters. Who can participate in the call auction? For how long should
the call auction be kept open? What order types should be supported?
How should the auction price be computed? What is the optimal level of
transparency which should be used? These questions are now relatively well
understood, with both conceptual ideas and empirical experience to guide
thinking in market design.
In summary, call auctions could be used to yield important improvements in
4the Indian securities market in seven ways:
1. Reducing principal-agent problems for institutional investors,
2. By giving investors a choice of achieving a zero impact cost trade,
3. By reducing transaction costs and execution risk in derivatives arbi-
trage,
4. By increasing the informativeness of the oﬃcial opening and closing
price,
5. By reducing bid-oﬀer spreads in the continuous market when news has
broken,
6. By oﬀering a market design that is more suited to illiquid products,
and
7. By oﬀering an alternative to market closure when faced with extreme
events.
This paper examines the role of call auctions for trading at exchanges. Sec-
tion 2 deﬁnes a call auction in comparison to continuous markets. Section 3
studies examples of call auctions used in international markets and its im-
pact. Section 4 examine similar situations in India and whether the call
auction might have a role to improve current market outcomes. Section 5
sets the framework within which to understand the link between design a
call auction and its objective. We then apply this to suggest what parame-
ters of the call auction design needs emphasis when being used in the Indian
context. Section 6 concludes.
2 Call auctions – an alternative to continuous
order-matching
Organised ﬁnancial trading at exchanges is usefully seen as a double-auction
where both buyers and sellers simultaneously participate in an auction. The
fundamental function of any trading mechanism is to collect buy and sell
orders, work out a market clearing price, and execute trades at this price.
52.1 The continuous market
The dominant market design at exchanges today is the electronic limit order
book market. This involves continuous order matching in response to every
order that comes into the market, and results in continuous trading.
This is a ‘multiple price auction’, for diﬀerent trades can take place simulta-
neously at diﬀerent prices, when a market order ‘walks up the book’ matching
against limit orders placed at diﬀerent prices.
2.2 The call auction
Ac a l la u c t i o ni sa na l t e r n a t i v em e c h a n i s mt h r o u g hw h i c he l e c t r o n i ct r a d i n g
can be organised. It involves two critical diﬀerences. First,i n s t e a do fa
continous matching of orders, there is a period of time in which orders are
accepted but no trades take place. Second,i ti sa‘ s i n g l ep r i c ea u c t i o n ’ .A t
the end of the call auction, all orders which can be matched are traded at a
single price.
Ap r o v i s i o n a lm a r k e tc l e a r i n gp r i c ei sc o m p u t e da st h ei n t e r s e c t i o no fs u p p l y
and demand curves during the period of the call auction. It is the single price
at which the maximal number of securities can be traded, given the orders
present in the book at that point in time. It is displayed in real time on
the computer screen. After a certain time period, the call auction is ended,
and all orders which can be matched at this single price are executed. Call
auctions can run for diﬀerent periods, starting from as short as a minute.
Once single-price matching has been done for an order book, there could be
orders left in it that cannot be matched. These order could be the natural
starting point for continuous order matching.
The market clearing price in the call auction price comes from a demand and
supply schedule comprising the consolidation of orders over a short period of
time. In contrast, in the continuous market, the market clearing price is at
the intersection between a potentially small number of orders present on the
screen at an instant in time.








Table 2 Call Auction: From Order book to Demand–Supply Schedule
Price Quantity
Sell Buy Supply Demand
345 150 50,000 150 72,000
349 25,000 10,000 25,150 22,000
350 250 10,000 25,400 12,000
351 2,000 25,400 2,000
355 15,000 40,400 0
2.3 An example
Suppose the auction order book for “Epicure, Ltd.”, consisted of the limit
orders shown in Table 1. These orders would imply the demand–supply sched-
ule shown in Table 2. The market clearing price would be decided by ﬁnding
the price at which the maximum quantity would be transacted or “cleared”.
This is shown in Table 3. The market clearing price works out to be 349, at
which a quantity of 22,000 shares are traded.1
However, seeing the total order imbalance on the buy side, suppose a new
order came into the market to “Sell 30,000@345”. The “auction book” would
shift to that in Table 4. In this table, there would be a new demand–supply
schedule, which would lead to a new market price of Rs. 345 to clear the
maximum quantity in the market. The “auction clearing price” would shift
to Rs. 345. The “auction ticker” would thus show a new provisional price of
1It need not always be the case that there is a unique price that clears the market. Part
of the design of the auction process is how such conﬂicts are resolved. For instance, one
of the more popularly used solutions is to use that price which is closest to the last traded
price (LTP), or the price that minimises the order imbalance. In the example shown here,
these considerations do not arise, for the turnover-maximising price is unique.
7Table 3 Call Auction: Finding the market clearing price
Price Quantity
Sell Buy Supply Demand Cleared
345 150 50,000 150 72,000 150
349 25,000 10,000 25,150 22,000 22,000
350 250 10,000 25,400 12,000 12,000
351 2,000 25,400 2,000 2,000
355 15,000 40,400 0 0
Table 4 Call Auction: Finding the market clearing price with new orders
Price Quantity
Sell Buy Supply Demand Cleared
345 30,150 50,000 30,150 72,000 30,150
349 25,000 10,000 55,150 22,000 22,000
350 250 10,000 55,400 12,000 12,000
351 2,000 55,400 2,000 2,000
355 15,000 70,400 0 0
“Rs. 345” when this new order came into the book.
At any point of time, if the auction ends, then all orders which can be
matched at the prevailing provisional price are paired oﬀ (at the single pro-
visional price), leaving an order book in which no orders are compatible with
each other. As an example, if we start from conditions in Table 4, and if
the auction ends, then all orders that can be matched at the single price of
Rs.345 are matched.
2.4 Strengths of the call auction
1. Greater liquidity through temporal aggregation The ‘temporal ag-
gregation’ of orders in the call auction, gives a relatively deep supply
and demand curve. This foster better price discovery, in comparison
with the relatively small number of orders from moment to moment
determining prices in the continuous market.
2. Reduced risk in the eyes of market participants At every moment,
there is uncertainty about the price in the continuous market. Traders
8are concerned about placing limit orders, since these run the risk of
being picked oﬀ by traders with better information. This is the risk of
asymmetric information.
In a continuous market, when news breaks, it is eﬃcient for many
traders to draw back, remove limit orders, and wait and see what price
is discovered by the market.
In a call auction, limit orders can be placed in a more secure environ-
ment, because no trades take place instantaneously. The trader can
see the provisional price shown on the screen, and modify or cancel his
order without fear of the risk of asymmetric information. When the
order is matched, there is an assurance that all buyers and sellers walk
away with one single price.
In both types of markets, limit orders faces the risk of non-execution
if their prices are far away from the market price. However, the call
auction is designed to give time to the trader to modify prices in an
environment of a slower pace of price discovery compared to the pace
of the continuous market.
3. Reduced transactions costs The continuous market imposes transac-
tions costs: market orders pay impact cost.I nc o n t r a s t ,i ft h eo r d e ri n
ac a l la u c t i o ni se x e c u t e d ,t h et r a d ed o e sn o ti n c u ra ni m p a c tc o s t .F o r
traders who wish to avoid paying impact cost, on the limit order book
market, the cost and complexity of ‘working an order’ – through limit
order placement and multi-stage order revision – is avoided.
4. Robustness to large orders In a continuous market, a large order can
“walk up the order book” and temporarily generate large price move-
ments, potentially driving volatility in prices and of liquidity. In the
call auction, large orders are part of the orderﬂow that determines the
market clearing price. Therefore, call auctions are at least as robust to
large orders compared to continuous markets.
5. Easing agency problems In the continuous market, when a customer
places a large order with a broker, there is the danger of front-running.
Since execution in the call auction is done at a single price, both the bro-
ker and the customer gets the execution at the single price announced
after the call auction, the same as everyone else.
9These features of call auctions make them an interesting alternative in situa-
tions when trading on the continuous market is daunting. While comparing
the market outcomes of price immediacy and access to liquidity, these fea-
tures mean the following diﬀerences between call auctions and continuous
markets:
• Immediacy of price. Like the continuous market where a “traded
price” is continuously disclosed, the call auction can also be designed
to continuously disclose a provisional price at which the auction clears.
Therefore, immediacy of prices can be generated in both markets.
However, immediacy of traded prices in the call auction is lower than
that in the continuous market. If the security is illiquid, with few trades
during the trading day, there will eﬀectively be little diﬀerence between
the immediacy of disclosed and the trade price.
• Price sensitivity to extreme values. An e wo r d e rw i l li n ﬂ u e n c et h e
market clearing price in both call and continuous markets.
However, the “traded price” in call auction would be less sensitive
to outliers compared to the continuous market price. A consequence
of this is that intra-day volatility of traded prices from a continuous
market would be higher than prices in a call auction.
• Immediacy of liquidity. Continuous markets oﬀer immediacy in or-
der execution. By construction, call markets do not: if a call auction
is to last for 15 minutes, then for 14 minutes and 59 seconds, transac-
tions have halted. Thus, continuous markets oﬀer higher immediacy of
liquidity than call auctions.
In most situations, the loss of liquidity for a few minutes may not
become a major constraint. However, there is one important task in
modern ﬁnance – dynamic delta hedging of nonlinear exposures – where
the continuous supply of liquidity is critically important. In such an
instance, continuous markets are better placed to deliver liquidity than
call auctions.
Table 5 summarises these diﬀerences in market quality, which comes down to
at r a d e - o ﬀb e t w e e nq u a l i t yo fp r i c eo fe x e c u t i o na n di m m e d i a c yo ft r a n s a c -
tion. The table suggests that if immediacy of trade is not ap r i o r i t y ,t h e nc a l l
auctions oﬀer an advantageous trading system with high price transparency,
10Table 5 Call Auction vs. Continuous trading: A comparison
Feature Call Auction Continuous
Price discovery
Disclosed price: immediacy Yes Yes
Disclosed price: sensitivity to extreme orders Yes Yes
Traded price: immediacy No Yes
Traded price: sensitivity to extreme orders Low High
Trade price: volatility Low Higher
Traded price: sensitivity to order size Low High
Liquidity
Trade immediacy No Yes
Market impact cost and non-execution risk Low Present
lower impact costs and lower trade price volatility. For instance, a lot of
ﬁnancial institutions typically do not require immediacy of trades. Instead,
they would prefer to be able to transact with (a) no price impact, (b) a single
price irrespective of the size of the trade, (c) no concerns about the execution
obtained by the brokerage ﬁrm and no possibility of front-running.
Market microstructure theory models the market as a combination of in-
formed traders and uninformed traders. In the continuous market, un-
informed traders have the choice of paying impact cost, or suﬀering non-
execution by placing limit orders. When some of the uninformed order ﬂow
(e.g. institutional investors) moves oﬀ to call auctions, this would tend to ex-
acerbate asymmetric information in the continuous market. If such adverse
selection takes place, we would see increased impact cost in the continuous
market, alongside the new alternative with zero impact cost being occas-
sionally available to all. While such a shift is predicted by the theory, the
empirical experience does not show such clear patterns.
3 International experience with call auctions
In this section, we examine the call auction designs used at some of the
largest exchanges in the world: NYSE, the London Stock Exchange, Paris
Stock Exchange/Euronext, Deutsche Bourse AG, Taiwan Stock Exchange
and others in the Asia Paciﬁc region. While call auction trading takes place
11at many other exchanges, these are important exchanges for which there
exists a large base of research literature. However, it is important to keep in
mind that some of these markets diﬀer from India in having broker/dealers
or market makers as key market participants. This inﬂuences the design and
implications of call auctions in these markets in certain ways.
3.1 Price discovery at market open: NYSE
Trading at the NYSE begins with a call auction. Traditionally, this was
not an electronic auction. Rather the auction was managed by “designated
market makers” (DMM) who posted a price depending upon the limit orders
they received during the opening period. The DMM was given some ﬂexibility
with respect to setting opening prices (ﬁrst trade and ﬁrst quotes). If there
was an order imbalance at the market clearing price, the DMM was obliged
to ﬁll the imbalance out of their own inventory.
The DMM set a single opening price to clear the market-on-open. Under
unusual circumstances, such as a “news pending” announcement or large
imbalances, the DMM could delay the opening or temporarily halt trading.
During this delay, non binding quote indications were usually issued on the
tape to signal the source of the delay and to attract limit orders. The market
power of the DMM was considerable, enhanced by privileged access to infor-
mation about the limit order book. In return, the DMM had an “aﬃrmative
obligation” to provide price continuity and maintain liquidity.
An analysis of price and spread characteristics around the opening, under
this market structure, suggested that prices tended to be more eﬃcient in
information adjustment when a call auction was in place, compared to con-
tinuous trading (Madhavan, 1992; Schwartz, 2001b; Brooks and Moulton,
2003).2
In the recent past, the role of the DMM in price discovery at the call has
been substantially reduced, with the call auction moving more towards being
an electronic call auction, with a market clearing price being continuously
2After the 1987 crash, the settlement of the S&P 500 futures traded at the Chicago Mer-
cantile Exchange (CME) was shifted to the NYSE open price. This enabled arbitrageurs
to exit their positions at the NYSE opening call auction and ensure a more orderly market.
12computed based on limit orders in an electronic order book. Relatively lit-
tle research is available about the behaviour of the NYSE pre-opening call
auction under this electronic environment.
3.2 Price discovery at the close: LSE
The London Stock Exchange (LSE) shifted to continuous electronic trading
in 1997. While the exchange used a call auction to open the market from the
beginning, a call auction for the closing was introduced only later in 2000.
The LSE continuous markets stops trading at 4:30 p.m, followed by a call
auction, where both limit orders and market orders are accepted. At 4:35pm,
the closing call algorithm runs to clear the market. The algorithm and price-
setting rules are the same as that used in the opening call. If there is no price
generated in the closing call auction, then the settlement price for a stock
at the end of the day is calculated from the last ten minutes of continuous
trading.
Since the introduction of a call auction at the close, there have been instances
where the closing auction process has thrown up rogue prices which sparked a
chorus of criticism from market players.3 The design of the closing auction at
the LSE was modiﬁed a few times, before settling at the following parameters:
1. Call auction for a period of 30 seconds.
2. Permit both market and limit orders.
3. Order entry and deletion are charged (1 pence).
LSE discloses the full order book in real time during the call phase.
Ellul et al. (2006) investigate the performance of call auctions at both the
opening and closing at the LSE. They focus on the diﬀerence between the call
auction and the “unoﬃcial” dealer network that ran in parallel. They ﬁnd the
call auction market dominates the dealer market in terms of price discovery.
However, they ﬁnd that call auctions suﬀer from a high failure rate, when
trading conditions are diﬃcult. Trading costs in the call market increased
whenever there was slow trading, order ﬂow imbalances, and uncertainty.
3http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/stock-exchange-forced-to-
defend-closing-auction-procedure-711855.html
13They conclude that the use of call auctions is negatively correlated to ﬁrm
size. This implies that the call may not be the optimal method for opening
and closing trading of medium and small sized stocks.
Battig and Chelley-Steeley (2010) examine the impact of the introduction of
a closing call auction at the LSE. They ﬁnd that market quality improved
for (liquid) securities during “market close”, as well as at “market open” the
next day.
3.3 Trading low-liquidity stocks: Paris Bourse, Eu-
ronext, Deutsche Bourse
Before the merger with Euronext in 2000, the Paris Stock Exchange (PSE)
ran a combination of continuous market and call auctions (Pagano and
Schwartz, 2003), where electronic call auctions were used:
• In the opening price discovery for all stocks.
• In the closing price determination for all stocks.
• For less liquid stocks.
For illiquid stocks, two more call auctions were conducted to consolidate
orders during the day in addition to the opening and closing auction. These
were conducted at mid-morning (11:30am), and then in the late afternoon
(at 4pm). PSE ran these auctions alongside with a dealer market, where
dealers were considered the last source of liquidity provision.
Thomas and Demarchi (2001) found that price discovery at the PSE was
enhanced during the call auction. They document a drop in market quality
when the opening call market was removed for a while, despite the fact that
the dealers were there to make market. Similarly, Pagano and Schwartz
(2003) found an improvement in market quality at the closing call auction,
not just at the close of market but also at the opening on the next day.
However, post-merger, Euronext retained the call auction process only for
the opening and the closing sessions. Price discovery and liquidity provision
for the illiquid stocks were handed over to the “liquidity providers” – market
makers who provide liquidity by posting two-way quotes.
14The Deutsche Borse (DB) AG, which was a key driver of innovation in the
ﬁnancial trading space in Europe, uses a pan European electronic system
(called “Xetra”) from November 1997. Along with continuous trading, DB
AG uses call auctions to enhance price discovery. The call auction is used for
trading liquid securities both before and after continuous trading. Less liquid
stocks are traded using periodic call auctions. These call auctions are not
electronic, but intermediated by “designated sponsors” who are mandated
to provide liquidity, like on Euronext. DB AG conducts two additional call
auctions, at mid-day and in the afternoon, for all stocks unlike Euronext.
The diﬀerences in the call auction at the two exchanges are:
1. The duration of the call phase has a random end at the DBorse AG.
The auction at Euronext ends at a ﬁxed time.
2. Call auctions at the DB AG has limited transparency. The order book
remains closed. Only the indicative auction price or the best bid and/or
ask limit is displayed. At Euronext, the order book is displayed.
3. While both systems use dealers to act as liquidity providers/designated
sponsors, disclosure about the selection criteria of these on the DB AG
is lower compared to the criteria on Euronext.
4. DB AG permits lower tick sizes compared to Euronext.
Kasch-Haroutounian and Theissen (2009) compares the quality of the overall
market and ﬁnd that, on average, spreads tend to be lower on the Deutsche
system compared to the Euronext system. Hoﬀman and van Bommel (2010)
focusses more on the eﬀect of the auction system. They study the design of
call auctions used at both exchanges in order to understand how diﬀerences
in design might imply diﬀerent market outcomes at both. They ﬁnd:
• The size of the order ﬂow coming into the opening auction is higher in
Euronext than at DB AG.
• The quality of market in the post-auction period tends to be better at
Euronext compared to DB AG.
• There is some evidence of attempts to manipulate prices of the illiquid
stocks from the order cancellation during the closing call on Euronext.
153.4 Other evidence on call auctions in exchanges
The Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) oﬀers an interesting case study of call
auction as a trading mechanism for India because all stocks here trade in a
series of periodic electronic call auctions without designated dealers. Each
auction run between a minute to 1.5 minutes depending upon the liquidity of
the stock. Chang et al. (1998) analyse the diﬀerence between the call auction
and a simulated continuous market and ﬁnd that:
1. Price discovery appears more eﬃcient in the call compared to the con-
tinuous auction market.
2. Call auction volatility tends to be half the volatility in the continuous
market.
3. Highly traded stocks demonstrate a larger drop in volatility under a
call auction than stocks with poor trading.
Huang (2004) studies market quality at the open of the Taiwan Derivatives
exchange (TAIFEX) which uses an electronic call auction and the Singapore
Derivatives exchange (SGX-DT) which opens using a open outcry continuous
market. He ﬁnds higher explicit transactions costs at the TAIFEX, but lower
eﬀective spreads. He also documents that trading volumes on SGX-DT to
eventually migrated to TAIFEX.
Several exchanges in the Asia Paciﬁc region4 open the markets with call auc-
tions (Comerton-Forde and Rydge, 2006a,b). They report that price discov-
ery improves when call auctions are used at market open. Comerton-Forde
and Rydge (2007) study the call auction used at the opening of the Stock Ex-
change at Hong Kong (SEHK). They document no beneﬁts in market quality
at the SEHK from the use of a call auction but also cite a ﬂaw in the design
of the call auction that led to this failure.5
Auctions at market close are particularly well-suited to the needs of institu-
tional investors, who can face considerable impact costs associated with large
transactions. Recent research show how the behaviour of market outcomes
4The exchanges covered are Australia, Malaysia, HongKong, Jakarta, Korea, Singapore,
Shanghai, Taiwan, Thailand, Tokyo.
5The SEHK stopped using the call auction when it was used to manipulate the closing
price in March 2009 (FinancialTimes, 2009).
16of call auctions at Euronext are increasingly reﬂecting a greater participation
by institutional investors (Hoﬀman and van Bommel, 2010).
An instance of the call auction at an exchange that is little considered is the
call auction used during the NYSE Liquidity Replenishment Points (LRP).
Single stocks which typically trade in the continuous market, automatically
move into these LRP call auction if the stock price moved beyond a pre-
determined range (called the “LRP range”). This range is based on the
volatility of the stock, and was originally recalculated every 30 seconds as a
function of the LTP. Traditionally, the DMM would take control of the order
book and oﬀer prices and adjust order imbalances. NYSE records show that
on a normal day, there are 100 LRP triggers. But on certain days, many more
LRPs have been triggered: e.g. on 6 May 2010, 1000 LRPs were triggered.
4 Potential application in India
In India, call auctions have been attempted in the past. BSE technical
documentation on BOLT from 1993 includes a section on using a call auction
for the “pre-opening” session. NSE implemented an call auction for both
the opening and closing of the market in 1999 (Camilleri and Green, 2005).
However, these are not in place today. Moreover, since these initial attempts,
there have been no new eﬀorts to implement call auctions for trading in the
equity markets.
In this section, we examine some instances to use call auctions in the Indian
equity market. These are auctions to
1. Decide the opening prices in the equity spot markets,
2. Decide the closing price for equity spot markets,
3. Use as the primary trading mechanism for illiquid products, and
4. Use as an alternative to circuit breakers/single security price bands.
For each instance, we start by examining the current market structure. We
attempt to put together an empirical analysis of current market outcomes to
see if the market could beneﬁt from having a call auction as an alternative
17trading mechanism. Lastly, we suggest what aspects of the call auction design
could be emphasised for a speciﬁc instance.
First, a detour into stylised empirical facts about intra-day market quality is
called for.
4.1 Stylised facts about intra-day market behaviour
Market eﬃciency is often measured by the behaviour of traded prices and
orders in the limit order book. Speciﬁcally, we examine patterns in the
volatility of traded prices,a n di nmarket liquidity as measured by the spread.
If a market is eﬃcient at discovering prices, there should be no patterns
of time dependence in both of these measures, since such patterns show a
tendency for prices and orders to adjust to new information slowly, rather
than adjusting rapidly.
We focus on quantifying market performance within the trading day. The
“Market-by-Price” (MBP) data from the NSE gives us access to: (a) Every
single traded price for all securities, and (b) the best bid and ask prices in the
limit order book (LOB). From the MBP data of October 2008, we use prices
for the index (“Nifty”), as well as for the most liquid stock (“Reliance”) and
the least liquid index stock (“Ambuja Cements”). We use data at one-second
intervals to calculate volatility in each minute, as the standard deviation of 60
observations of the percentage change of price within the minute. Liquidity is
measured as the “relative spread” for individual stocks, calculated as ((Bid−
Ask)/Midpoint quote) at every second.
Figure 1 illustrates this intra-day volatility in the Indian stock markets, av-
eraged across all the trading days of October 2008. We can see the markets
start with disproportionately high volatility at the very start of the market.
Visual inspection appears to indicate that the higher volatility lives for an
extremely short period. However, statistical tests show that the market re-
mains in a period of high volatility for as long as half an hour after the start
of the market.
Finance literature documents a strong link between the link between tempo-
ral patterns in volatility and liquidity, at the level of daily data. Here, we see
that it holds for the behaviour of intra-day volatility and liquidity as well, as
illustrated in Figure 2, which shows intra-day market volatility and liquidity
18Figure 1 Intra-day volatility of Indian equity, Oct 2008
Each point on the graph is the standard deviation of returns within a minute, using
price data that has been discretised to a frequency of one second. Realised volatility was
averaged for all trading days of October 2008. Nifty has the lowest intra-day volatility at
an average of 0.1% during the day, compared to 0.24% for Reliance, and 0.9% for Ambuja
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19for Reliance and Ambuja Cements on one day, 10th October 2008. Here, the
ﬁrst “row” has the graphs of intra-day volatility, and the second “row” has
the graphs of intra-day relative spreads, calculated as described above.
Statistical tests conﬁrm that:
1. There are time dependencies in intra-day volatility of the current equity
market, which implies that information is being incorporated slowly
into prices and there is scope to improve market eﬃciency.
2. Intra-day spreads of the individual stocks display the same patterns.
The higher the spread, the higher transaction cost. Any improvement
in the market outcome of volatility could likely mean better liquidity,
and lower transactions costs.
3. There is some regularity with which volatility shifts across diﬀerent
levels during a trading day. On average, volatility shifts down to a
lower level after 10:30am,a n dt h e nm o v e su pa g a i nafter 2:30pm.
4.2 Price at market open
Currently, equity exchanges start trading by opening the limit order book
directly into the continuous market. At the start, the limit order book starts
empty, ﬂushed of all orders from the previous day.
Figure 1, in the previous section, showed the clear presence of the higher
volatility in traded prices as one of the outcomes of the current market struc-
ture. The stylised facts about the behaviour of intra-day volatility at the start
of the day are:
1. Higher opening market volatility is persistent across all securities. Since
this is driven by overnight news and information while the markets were
closed, this is not unexpected.
What is not expected is that it takes half an hour, on average, for
prices to adjust. This high “persistence” of volatility is indicative of
ineﬃciency in how slowly market prices adjust to new information.
2. Statistical tests show that the time taken for the prices to shift from the
high “opening market” volatility to the normal “mid-market” volatility
varies across (a) securities and (b) days. This seems to suggest that
20Figure 2 Intra-day market outcomes for single stocks on 10th October 2008
These graphs compare the patterns of intra-day volatility and liquidity for Reliance (high
liquidity) and Ambuja Cements (lower liquidity) for a single day 10th Oct 2008.
Realised volatility is the measured as the standard deviation of returns in a minute, using
one-second returns data. Relative spread is measured as the (bid − ask/midpoint quote)
using one-second order book data.
The vertical lines on the volatility graphs mark the time points where statistical tests
show that prices typically shift from one level of volatility in the market to another. At
10:30am, the volatility shifts down from the high volatility of “market opening” to the
lower “normal market”. Between 2pm and 2:30pm, the securities typically shift from the
“normal market” volatility to a slightly higher volatility of “market closing”.
Reliance with higher liquidity (relative spread of 7 basis points on average) has lower
levels of intra-day volatility compared to Ambuja Cements with weaker liquidity (average
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21diﬀerent stocks require diﬀerent periods to complete price discovery at
the start of the day in the current market structure.6
3. Each security has a diﬀerent “highest” level of intra-day volatility at the
start of the day. The amount by which the “opening market” volatility
is higher is correlated with the liquidity of the stock. For example,
Reliance has lower opening market volatility Ambuja Cements.
Given that there will always be overnight news and information that has to
be captured into a country’s market price, it is perhaps inevitable that the
opening market price will be far more “volatile” in any market compared to
(say) the “closing” price. Our concern is that the market eﬃciency could be
improved. Currently, the market takes half hour on average to adjust to the
news.
The above suggests there is a strong case to support starting the market
using a call auction. If the (uncertain) order ﬂow at the start of the day is
consolidated over a period, and participants allowed to see where the rest
of the market stands, there is scope for the call auction to deliver better
outcomes in terms of volatility, for each stock, and uniformity across all
stocks. In addition, we expect that if a call auction can succeed in achieving
lower volatility, this will also lower transaction costs of trading equity.
4.3 Prices at market close
Currently, the market continues trading using continuous order matching till
3:30pm. Closing prices are calculated as a weighted average of the last 30
minutes of traded prices (NSE), or the last 30 trades (BSE). After this, a
post-close session runs where orders can be entered for trading at the closing
price. There are two reasons why it might be useful to calculate the closing
price out of a call auction instead of either approaches used currently.
First, theoretical arguments as well as empirical evidence in the published
literature show that the weighted average methods of calculating the closing
price are vulnerable to manipulation compared to the price from a call auction
6 These are amongst the most liquid in the country. Further analysis is required to
understand whether less liquid securities than the ones in the index take longer. This
would imply that the call auction should be kept longer or shorter depending upon the
liquidity of the stock.
22(Hillion and Suominen, 2004). Further, Battig and Chelley-Steeley (2010)
show that call auctions at the close improves pricing eﬃciency during the
closing, as well as for the opening of the next day. Second, the stylised facts
from Figure 1 about the close of the current market structures shows:
1. Volatility at the close of the market starts becoming higher between
2:00 and 2:30pm. This is more consistent time of shift in volatility,
across stocks and across days, compared with the time that “open
market” volatility comes down to “mid-market” volatility.
2. On average, “closing market” volatility is not much higher than normal
“mid-day” volatility.
3. The higher “closing market” volatility persists over a longer period
when compared to how long “open market” persists at the start of the
day. “Closing market” volatility tends to last from around 2:00pm to
3:30pm.
The main concern of traders at the closing of the market is the need to exit
their positions. The number of trades per minute goes up sharply as the
market approaches closing time. Both the high concentration of trades and
consistently higher volatility suggest the use of a call auction to close the
market more eﬃciently.
At the close, there is an added emphasis to design the auction to discourage
manipulation. There are signiﬁcant economic gains to be had by inﬂuenc-
ing closing price compared inﬂuencing the opening price, since the closing
price has implications for the mark-to-market valuation carried out at all
ﬁnancial institutions related to capital requirements, margin calls, proﬁts for
derivative positions, etc. This is reﬂected in the literature, which documents
more problems at exchanges with a closing call auction than an opening call
auction.
4.4 Large market moves
Currently, there are two market-controls on large price movements:
1. Market wide circuit breakers: When the stock market index moves
outside of a ﬁxed range of values (at 10%,15%,20%), the market halts
23for trading (the period of the halt depends upon the time of day that
the large movement took place).
2. Speciﬁc to individual stocks: Trading is permitted only within
“price limits” or “price bands”.
The bands are calculated every day relative to the previous day closing
price. The width of the band is derived from the previous volatility of
the stock.
The ﬁrst control slows down the price discovery process temporarily. The
second one has the more damaging eﬀect of censoring the prices in the market.
The motivation for the controls on prices is to limit volatility when it is
diﬃcult to discern what drives the price change. The price change could
be legitimate if there is news about the ﬁrm or the economy that justiﬁes a
large change in value. The alternative is that the prices are moving due to a
manipulative attempt.
Price controls are considered beneﬁcial because (a) they prevent overreac-
tion by the market participants to uncertainty of information, and more
importantly, (b) they bind price volatility and therefore, limit the risk in the
market. This could help the market be more eﬃcient and orderly. However,
since neither of the controls listed above diﬀerentiates between these two pos-
sible causes of the price move, they can instead lead to weak price discovery
and persistent market volatility.
Price controls are considered costly because (a) they curtail prices from
quickly adjusting to their new level, (b) they interfere with liquidity since no
trades can happen beyond the limit ranges, (c) they cause the high volatility
due to information changes to persist in the marketplace. For large informa-
tion shocks, that require the price to go beyond the stated band, price limits
force information transmission to be spread out over a longer period. This
implies that the market is not just disclosing a distorted price at every point,
but it builds in a persistence of the distortion.
Evidence from several empirical studies that price limits have no impact, or
lead to weaker price discovery in ﬁnancial markets. There is more evidence
to show eﬀects of volatility spillover across periods when price limits are
binding in the market. These studies span the eﬀect of price limits across
spot market as well as derivative markets, as well as across diﬀerent market
structures.
24Since the call auction oﬀers the beneﬁt of better price discovery with asym-
metric information, an alternative way of managing large price moves is to
shift from continuous trading into a call auction, at the moment the “price
band” is hit. With order consolidation and clearing price disclosure, the call
auction could prove to be a more eﬃcient method of discovering a trusted
price while simultaneously managing systemic risk, compared with the two
controls currently in place.
In the proposed scenario, when a large price move takes place, the market
would switch from a continuous market into a call auction for a few minutes.
The call auction would discover a single trusted price, and bequeath an order
book for the recommencement of continuous trading.
4.5 Trading illiquid securities
Despite the great improvement in market quality that the market has gained
since the reforms of the nineties, a glaring ﬂaw is how heavily skewed liquidity
is towards a small fraction of securities. Typically, these are securities of large
listed ﬁrms, that have always had ready access to ﬁnance.
The most credible data for both market capitalisation and liquidity is of the
ﬁrms that make up the CMIE Cospi index 7 (Shah et al.,2 0 0 8 ) .T y p i c a l l y ,
there are around 2500-2700 ﬁrms in the COSPI set. Market capitalisation
is captured as the average for the ﬁrm in March of the year. Liquidity is
measured by the ﬁrms turnover ratio.8
For the ﬁnancial year 2009-2010, around 2000 of these ﬁrms had market
capitalisations spanning a range from 200,000 USD upto 76 billion USD.
Only 25% of the ﬁrms (under 500) had market capitalisations above 100
million USD. This skewness in their size was reﬂected in their liquidity. It is
these top 500 largest companies that have turnover ratios of more than 100%
7Cospi is a portfolio with a large number of stocks, calculated at the Center for Moni-
toring Indian Economy (CMIE). The set of eligible stocks is recalculated every day, where
eligibility is deﬁned as having a historical trading frequency of above 66%. For all practical
purposes, there is no meaningful equity market beyond the Cospi ﬁrms.
8Turnover ratio is measured as the fraction between the annual traded volume of the
security to their market capitalisation. A liquid security can trade many times more than
its size in the markets over the year.
25Figure 3 Distribution of trades at the NSE across ﬁrm centiles, Oct 2008
Each point on the graph is the average number of trades per centile. The graph shows
that there is a steadily growing trading activity from the bottom centile to 80% of the
ﬁrms. It is around 15% – under 150 ﬁrms out of 1215 ﬁrms – account for more than half
the trading activity on the NSE.









































on average. The bottom 500 among these liquid companies have turnover
ratios of under 50% on average.
We look at trading activity of these ﬁrms in the day as an alternative measure
of their liquidity as seen in Table 3. In Oct 2008, there were around 1215
ﬁrms that traded on NSE. The smallest number of trades was once a day,
while the largest number was more than half a million trades in 5.5 hours of
trading. Of these ﬁrms, 50% traded under 1000 trades.
Thus, a large fraction of the listed companies in the country suﬀer extremely
varied levels of liquidity using continuous trading. The greatest beneﬁt of
26continuous trading is the immediacy of liquidity. For a very large fraction
of listed stocks, the liquidity is too sparse to justify the need for continuous
access to liquidity. Call auctions that consolidate orders over a period of time
and results in a trade at a predeﬁned time naturally recommends itself as
the alternative trading mechanism. In fact, trading such stocks on the call
auction rather than continuous markets could likely beneﬁt for two reasons:
1. A single call auction with advance intimation about the time of the
call could be much more successful in attracting orders, by oﬀering
the trade oﬀ of no immediacy during the day to a competitive market
equilibrium price at a ﬁxed time in the day.
2. Continuous markets, where the time of trade is uncertain, leaves the
buyer/seller vulnerable to take prices that are far from fair-value. This
results in a “liquidity premium” that the buyer/seller is willing to suﬀer
as cost of transaction. For illiquid stocks, this cost tends to be very
high.
In an auction that is held at a clearly speciﬁed time that is universally dis-
closed, there is a higher chance of obtaining the order ﬂow required to build
am o r ea c c u r a t ed e m a n d – s u p p l yt od e t e r m i n eap r i c ec l o s e rt ot h ef a i rv a l u e
of the security.
Going beyond the equity spot market, there are important pockets of illiq-
uidity in India with certain equity derivatives series (e.g. a deep in the money
option on Nifty with 3 month maturity, or a INR/JPY futures with six month
maturity), and with the bond market.
4.5.1 Bond market liquidity
One set of illiquid securities that deserve mention here are bonds. Corporate
bonds are already among the securities listed for trade on the exchanges,
and trade very infrequently on the continuous market even in comparison to
the least traded stocks. The reasoning outlined above for using call auctions
to improve market quality of illiquid equity apply equally for the corporate
bond market.
However, the outcome of improved price eﬃciency and liquidity using a call
auction has more signiﬁcant ramiﬁcations for the government bond market.
27While the primary market for these bonds are done using the auction pro-
cess by default, secondary market trading is not. In fact, secondary market
trading has always been a dealer-brokered market in the past. Only in the
last decade has there been a development of electronic markets for secondary
market trading of treasuries (Mizrach and Neely, 2006).
In India, the current market structure for trading (say) central government
bonds are two: a continuous market called the Negotiated Dealing System
(NDS) that is operated by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and has been
in place since 2000, and a dealer market. However, some characteristics of
the government bond market in India makes it a candidate to use electronic
call auctions for trading. These characteristics are common to most treasury
bond markets, and are:
Pattern of market participants
Unlike in the Indian equity markets where the participant base is a mix-
ture of retail investors (generating around 80% of the traded volume)
and institutions, the participants in these markets are restricted to the
set of all ﬁnancial institutions. These include banks, primary dealers,
insurance ﬁrms, mutual funds, pension funds, trust funds. The con-
tinuous order matching NDS market is accessed by the large ﬁnancial
institutions such as the primary dealers and banks, while the rest of
the bond market participants trade in the dealer market.
While this number of participants is smaller compared to that of the
equity markets, there is a large size heterogeniety amongst these rang-
ing from the very large (banks, insurance ﬁrms, pension funds) to the
very small (trust funds). In such a heterogenous mix, there is a higher
problem of asymmetric information, where the larger participants have
the power to set the prices (“leaders”) and the smaller participants
follow (“followers”). In the continuous market, such an organisation
can lead to a large heterogeniety in prices available to diﬀerent partici-
pants. In some situations, this characater of the market also makes the
“followers” vulnerable to price distortions away from the true market
value.9
9An example of the “leaders” proﬁtting at the cost of “followers” was the case of
Citigroup’s controversial euro area government bond trades in August 2004. Citigroup
traders initiated concerted sell orders in the bond market that caused a disruption in
market prices, before the traders bought the bonds back at a proﬁt of nearly ten million
28In addition, each of the ﬁnancial institutions listed above are likely
to trade diﬀerent sizes, thereby paying varying levels of impact costs,
resulting in signiﬁcantly diﬀerent prices of transaction for what ought
to be the least risk security in the country.
Unlike in a continuous market, or a dealer-intermediated market, the
call auctions process that delivers a single market clearing price to all
participants at a given point in time would be optimal compared to the
highly diﬀerential prices that diﬀerent participants are likely to access
in a continuous market.
Current liquidity patterns
Most of the liquidity in the treasury bond market is concentrated in the
“on–the–run” bonds – those bonds that have been issued recently. Typ-
ically, bonds have some secondary market liquidity in the six months
after their issuance, and practically none after. This is evident in the
patterns of trading intensity on this market.
The readiest access to liquidity of the government bond market is from
trades on the RBI-NDS market. This data shows that typically there
are less than 30 securities that trade in the market at any given point in
time. These include: “on–the–run” Treasury bonds (long dated bonds
issued by the Central Govt.), Treasury bills (short dated Central Govt.
securities), call money, non-standard repo, dated state government and
public sector unit bonds. There are very few trades in state government
bonds.
Of these, the number of trades on any given day tends to be between
25-50 trades for the highest traded bond. Trading intensity tends to
be highest in March, where the number can cross 75-100 trades in a
day. What is important is that there tends to be a signiﬁcant variation
in the prices for the same security within the day by time and by size
of trade.10 With call auctions, there would be one price. Thus, if the
GBP. While the UK Financial Services Authority took away the proﬁts and ﬁned Citigroup
an additional four million GBP (Euroweek, 2009), the trade was not classiﬁed as market
abuse.
10For instance, on 10th June 2010, NDS trade data show the “8.24% GOVT.STOCK
2018” as the most traded security. The prices show large variation as large as INR. 5, over
29market closed with a call auction used to determine the closing price
of the bonds, the “followers” would be able to trade market orders
without any impact cost.
An auction to determine the closing price in the treasury bond market
has deep economic ramiﬁcations, going beyond closing prices in the
equity market. Traded prices of bonds today are used in the calculation
of the daily “zero coupon yield curve” which is the estimated term
structure of interest rates for India.
Currently, the estimation is sensitive to market prices that carry vary-
ing degrees of the “liquidity premium” depending upon the liquidity
premium of a speciﬁc bond. If these prices are instead taken from a
closing call auction, the estimated term structure would be less dis-
torted by the varying degrees of “liquidity premium” from the diﬀerent
bond prices.
5 Design of call auctions
The dominant reason cited in the literature for the use electronic call auction
is that they are better designed to handle price discovery in the face of
asymmetric information in the market (Madhavan, 1992; Schwartz, 2001a).
If the impact of asymmetric information can be reduced, it would eﬀectively
lower the cost of trading, result in a lower volatility in the traded price and
a greater eﬃciency in the price discovery process.
a small period of time:










30With the access to technology available today, electronic call auctions can
be readily deployed as alternative trading systems, along with continuous
trading. Electronic call auctions can be designed to disclose the market
clearing price as immediately as orders are added to, or drop oﬀ, from the
demand–supply schedule.
5.1 Principles for call auction design
Ac a l la u c t i o ni ss u c c e s s f u li fs i g n i ﬁ c a n to r d e rﬂ o wc o m e st ot h ea u c t i o n
book during the consolidation period. The auction must be designed and
run to always attract as comprehensive a coverage of the demand and supply
schedule as is possible. When the full demand and supply for a security
clears, the prices comes closest to the equilibrium price. There are two key
bottlenecks that stand in the way of attracting all trading interest into a call
auction. These are:
• Any individual participant will be interested in entering orders in a call
auction once they believe that everyone else will participate as well. If
the participants think that they will be disadvantaged in terms of their
access to all relevant information, they would be wary to enter the
trading process without seeing that others have placed their orders.
Thus, their incentive to participate in a call auction tends to be the
participation of others.
As t a n d a r do b s e r v a t i o na b o u tc a l la u c t i o n si st h a tp a r t i c i p a n t st e n d
to wait till the last moment before placing their orders. In such a
situation, while the auction price will be the result of a consolidated
order ﬂow, the price discovery beneﬁt over the period of the auction
will be lost.
• Orders might be placed with the deliberate intent to manipulate dis-
closed prices.
As in a continuous market, the provisional price is calculated to max-
imise the order. Unlike in the continuous market, an order in a call
auction market does not immediately result in a trade. With the abil-
ity enter, modify and cancel orders, manipulating the disclosed price
so as to inﬂuence price discovery can be done at a lower cost in the call
auction than in the continuous market.
31These become the following speciﬁc set of objectives for any call auction:
1. How to incentivise participants to place limit orders to buy and sell as
early on in the auction period as possible to encourage price discovery?
2. How to actively discourage orders placed with the intention of falsely
inﬂuencing the disclosed price?
3. Should one design of the auction be uniformly applied to all instances
of use of the call auction in the trading system? Or should diﬀerent
auction designs be used for diﬀerent purposes, for diﬀerent audiences,
and for diﬀerent securities markets?
5.2 Parameters of a call auction
The most important parameters deﬁning a call auction are:
Q: What are the entry barriers to participating in the call auction?
Q: How long the auction will be kept open to receive orders?
Q: What kind of orders are permitted – market orders, or only limit orders?
What is the prioritisation of matching between market and limit orders
at the end of the auction?
Q: How is the auction price calculated?
Q: What is the “optimal” level of transparency of the auction? Should
the market clearing price be continuously disclosed, or just the price
at the time of close of the auction? Should the entire demand–supply
schedule is disclosed to the participants during the auction, or just the
best price to buy and sell?
In the following section, we examine some answers to these questions. In
many cases, there is no one answer, and there is a role for identifying the
design most suited to the question at hand.
5.2.1 What entry barriers?
Recommendation: The call auction should be considered part of the trad-
ing process of the market. All the normal entry criteria that apply to
32buy/sell a security will apply here.
Argument: In India, anyone can trade in the continuous market as long as
they post some initial margin with the exchange. Once a position is
taken, the clearing corporation marks the position to market, calculates
al o s so rap r o ﬁ ta n de n s u r e st h a tt h em a r g i ni ss u ﬃ c i e n tt oc o v e ra n y
loss. Similar requirements ought to be applied for participants of the
call auction.
5.2.2 For how long?
Recommendation: The length of the auction can diﬀer depending upon
where it is being applied. The key idea is that the auction should be
kept open as long as it takes to gather the best possible demand–supply
schedules for the security.
In order to encourage early order placement in the book, and discourage
last-moment order cancellation/modiﬁcation, the auction might adopt
the following features:
1. The actual close of the auction could be at a random time point,d e ﬁ n e d
relatively close to the oﬃcially stated closing time of the auction.
2. There could be a charge for order placement into the call auction. The
charges could follow a graded scale where the charges increases as the
auction comes toward a close.
3. Time priorities of orders that are modiﬁed should be reset to reﬂect
the time of the modiﬁcation.
Argument: The auction period is the length of time that the auction is
open for collection and consolidation of orders. We know that:
• The longer the period of the auction, the lower the immediacy of liq-
uidity available to participants.
• The longer the period of the auction, the more vulnerable the disclosed
price could be to being manipulated.
Call auctions that are successful at exchanges in the world run over
a short period, stemming from the observation that most of the order
ﬂow enter the book close to the end of the auction. In addition, various
33exchanges ﬁnd evidence that vulnerability to manipulation goes down
when there is uncertainty about the exact time that the market stops
taking in orders and calculates the market clearing price.
Solutions that aim to encourage participants towards early order placement
and discourage malicious orders that mislead price discovery are:
Randomised time of auction closure What emerges from the experience
of various call auction implementations is that auctions with a ﬁxed
time of closure are vulnerable to manipulation. One mechanism com-
monly used to deter manipulation is to declare that the auction will
close at a random time. Prior to the auctions, participants are only
informed of the range of time within which the auction could close.
For example, if there is a call auction for the opening price calculation
which starts at 9:30am, and the continuous market starts at 10am, the
auction could close anywhere between 5 to 10 seconds before 10am. We
discuss this in more detail in the Section 4.3.
Graded charges for orders placed 11 The charges for orders placed
in the system should be to encourage early placement and limit order
placement. Therefore:
1. Charges for any orders placed in the call auction ought to be lower
than the fees charged for orders in the continuous market.
2. Orders that are entered at the start of the auction ought to be charged
the least. The charges could start at as low as 0 and go up to a
maximum for entry at closest to the close of auction.
3. Charges for order modiﬁcation/cancellation should exponentially in-
crease closer to the time of auction close.
If orders are placed with intent to distort the disclosed price during the
price discovery, then high charges for order modiﬁcation would increase
the cost of mischief making.
Charges for order modiﬁcation/cancellation must be sensitive to the
kind of information asymmetry that the auction is being used to over-
come. Around periods of high ﬂow of information, market participants
will need to modify/cancel orders. Therefore, ﬁxed or no charges for
11Economides and Schwartz (1995) suggests this as an incentive for early order entry.
34order modiﬁcation/cancellation automatically with time may result in
eﬃcient market participation. This is unlike the market closing session
where price volatility is driven largely because of changes in liquid-
ity. Here, charges that increase as the auction comes to a close might
motivate more orderly participation in the call auction.
It must be noted that there appears to be no exchange that uses a
time-graded charge on order placement. Most report ﬁxed charges for
orders.
5.2.3 What order types?
Recommendation: Both limit orders as well as market orders ought to be
permitted. However, the design of the auction should include:
1. The priority with which each type of order will be matched at the
end of the auction. Here, time priority is an obvious choice since it
replicates what happens in the “normal continuous” market.
2. If there is order imbalance at the end of the auction, there should be
clear rules of how the imbalance is to be resolved.
Argument: It is optimal to permit all orders into the book, if the auction
objective is to achieve as comprehensive a demand–supply curve as
possible. Limit orders bring information about liquidity and prices to
the market, while market orders consume liquidity – they contribute
to the size of the transaction but not the price discovery. Particularly
in a call auction, it is important to have limit orders since an auction
with only market orders cannot contribute to price discovery.12
The problem arises when there is a possibility of an order imbalance,
and there is a trade-oﬀ between matching market versus limit orders in
the book. One approach is to match all orders based on time priority.
Another approach is to execute all the “winning” orders on a pro-rata
basis. For examples, if a limit order in the auction had 200 shares, a
market order had 300, and the counter party has only 400 shares, the
12When the LSE ﬁrst started a call auction on market open in 1997, the call allowed
only limit orders. However, that was modiﬁed in 1999 to include market orders (Ellul
et al., 2006).
35limit order will get a trade for 160 shares, and the market order trades
240.
Another question is: what happens to the unﬁlled orders at the end
of the call auction? While the unﬁlled limit orders can go into the
continuous market order book, a market order can either be traded
against the best available prices or move as limit orders with the auction
clearing price into the continuous market.
These are part of the choices that exchanges will have to clarify as part
of the design of the auction.
5.2.4 How to compute the auction price?
Recommendation: The auction price is the one that maximises the quan-
tity traded. The clearing price maximises the trade quantity.
If there are multiple prices at which the same quantity can trade, the
auction price is that which minimises order imbalance. If there are mul-
tiple prices at which both conditions about the quantity are satisﬁed,
the auction price could likely be picked at random among the choices.
If there are no orders, the auction price should be set to the a weighted
average of a set of the last traded price. If the auction is for the open-
ing of the market, the auction price could be the closing price of the
previous day.
There is little justiﬁcation for price bands on the call auction price.
Argument: The market clearing price is calculated to maximise the quan-
tity that will get traded at that price. A well designed call auction will
have rules on how to deal with the situation when there is more than
one price that maximises the same traded quantity.
Most call auctions have a set of well-deﬁned rules when this situation
arises, which falls back upon a notion of a “benchmark/reference” price.
In the “older” structure of exchanges like the NYSE/Euronext/DB AG,
the fall back was on the system of specialists who typically provide
liquidity in parallel with the continuous system. On electronic limit
order book markets like Indian equity markets, the reference price could
be the last traded price.
36Henke and Voronkova (2005) show how price limits result in delaying
price adjustment and cause spillover of volatility across days at the call
auction at the Warsaw Stock Exchange.
5.2.5 How much transparency?
Recommendation: In order to aid the price discovery process, there ought
to be high disclosure of the provisional price. This could be disclosed
whenever it is calculated, or at regular intervals during the period of
the call.
The extent of order book transparency could diﬀer depending upon
what the call auction is being used for.
There should be full anonymity of the counter party identities to enable
consolidation at the highest level.
Argument: Transparency of the electronic call auction should be considered
from twin dimensions of what information to disclose and a trade-oﬀ.
“What information to disclose” includes (a) price and (b) the set of
orders that form the demand–supply schedule.
The “trade-oﬀ” is how much of this information contributes to true
price discovery versus how much it can be used to manipulate price
discovery. While the principle of full disclosure stands behind the idea
that the cost of price manipulation is high in liquid and competitive
markets, the same principle may not deliver the best results when the
market is illiquid, or has imperfect competition.
Price disclosure Prices in an electronic call auction can be disclosed in
varying degrees from
• “least transparency”: where only the clearing price is disclosed to the
market, to
• “maximum transparency”: where the market clearing price calculated
for every fresh order that enters the auction order book, is disclosed.
The rationale for more disclosure of the market clearing price is that
when there is asymmetric information leading to market volatility, par-
ticipants can use the disclosed price to update their understanding
about the value of the security in the face of new information. If there
37is no transparency in the market clearing price, there is no clear signal
about the impact of the information for the value of the security.
Order book disclosure Similar to prices, the orders that make up the
demand and supply schedule can disclosed in varying degrees from
• “least transparency”: where only the quantity that would clear at the
current market clearing price is disclosed.
For example, this is the level of disclosure in call auctions run at the
NYSE and the Deutsche Bourse.
• “maximum transparency”: where the full set of orders in the demand
and supply schedule are constantly made available to the market par-
ticipants.
For example, at Euronext, the best ﬁve orders around the market clear-
ing price are displayed to the market participants in real time.
Higher order book transparency could either be a signal to participants
about the entire demand–supply which could incentivise better partic-
ipation. It could be a deterrent to institutional traders whose order
sizes that are large compared to the auction order book, and who do
not wish to be known to be trading in the market. Exchanges could
choose the level of order book disclosure to suit the purpose and the
target audience for the auction.
For example, while auctions at Euronext have high disclosure in terms
of displaying the best orders to participants, they also permit hidden
orders in the auction book.
The literature on call auctions supports more disclosure of the orders in the
book than less. Participants prefer to place orders in markets where they are
conﬁdent that others will too. This derives from the co-ordination motive”
for trading (Ellul et al.,2 0 0 6 ) .I fat r a d e ri si n c e n t i v i s e dt op l a c eo r d e ri nt h e
auction by seeing the number and size of the orders already in the book, then
the auction should be designed to disclose more about the demand–supply in
the market. The studies on the comparison between Euronext and DB AG in
Section 3.3 supports higher order transparency of Euronext, especially if the
target market has a signiﬁcant presence of institutional investors (Hoﬀman
and van Bommel, 2010). On the ﬂip side, they also document evidence of
more attempts to manipulate the closing price of illiquid securities “swiping”
38orders in the auction.
5.3 Towards a call auction design for India
Finally, we use the framework outlined above to examine a set of possible
parameters for the auctions that we proposed to be implemented in Indian
equity markets in Section 4. The stylised facts presented in Section 4.1
on intra-day volatility and liquiditiy indicate the following choices may be
optimal in the design of the these call auctions.
Price at market open
• Since it is critical to have maximum participation in the opening
auction, the opening call ought to beneﬁt from the continuous
disclosure of the clearing price. Similar beneﬁts are likely to accrue
with more disclosure of the auction order book than not, as is done
in the Euronext/LSE opening call auctions.
• Order modiﬁcations/cancellations are more likely to be motivated
by genuine reasons to discover the price. Thus, the charges for
these should be relaxed compared to (say) when the probability
of manipulation is higher.
• Aw i d e rr a n g eo fp r i c e so u g h tp e r m i t t e di nt h eo p e n i n gp r i c ec a l l
auction because of genuine news and information at the start of
trade. It would be optimal to have no price bands at all, particu-
larly for the liquid securities (Henke and Voronkova, 2005).
Prices at market close
• There is less dependence on the auction for price discovery since
the closing call auction comes immediately after continuous trad-
ing.
Therefore, the price range permitted for a closing call auction
ought to be much tighter than those used in an open call auction,
particularly for liquid stocks.
• The auction period can be short to reduce the time between the
continuous market and the closing of the market.
39• The random time of closing the auction could be an eﬀective mech-
anism to discourage placement of frivolous orders to mislead the
clearing price.
• The amount of order book disclosure can be more restricted as
compared to the opening call auction, more in line with the order
disclosure adopted by the Deutsche Bourse.
• Larger orders could be charged less than smaller orders.
Large market moves
For extreme market movements, the likely auction design parameters
are:
• The auction could be automatically triggered when the LTP reaches
95% of the “price band” that the exchanges internally sets for each
security at the start of the day.
• As h o r ta n dﬁ x e da u c t i o np e r i o di sl i k e l yt ob es u ﬃ c i e n tf o rp r i c e
discovery on individual securities. A longer period could be used
for a large market-wide movement.
• There ought to be continuous disclosure of the market clearing
price. The extent of disclosure of the order books ought to be left
to the exchanges to set, as a function of the type of movement
that triggered the price ﬂuctuation.
• At the end of the auction period, if the price exceeds the earlier
“price band” by more than 50% (say at 25% rather than at 20%,
the auction will not close.
Instead, it should roll over into another call (same duration and
rules as the previous one). This has the beneﬁt of giving the
market some more time to discover the price.
• If a second auction is triggered, it ought to have a random close.13
Trading illiquid securities
13The time of the second auction should be a random number between 20% to 80% of
the time of the ﬁrst auction.
If the ﬁrst auction runs for 5 minutes, then the second auction should run for anywhere
between 1 and 4 minutes.
40A call auction held to trade illiquid securities may beneﬁt from the
following design parameters:
• The time at which the call auction should be widely disclosed to
the public, and well in advance of the actual auction itself.
• The frequency of the auction should be a function of the current
trading frequency.
For example, if the stock trades a few trades every day, it could
have one auction. If the stock trades a few trades every hour,
there can be several call auctions.
• In order to maximise the probability of participation, auctions for
very illiquid stocks can be held in the middle of the trading day
when the trading for liquid stocks is at the lowest.14 Auctions for
illiquid stocks can run after market opening and before market
closing.
• The auction close can be a ﬁxed time so as to encourage more
order placement. However, it should be well publicised that there
will be higher charges for order cancellation close to the end of
the auction.
Secondary market trading for treasury, state government and public sector bonds
The bond market would most likely beneﬁt using the call auction in
all the areas that have listed above for the equity markets. The price
volatility in prices observed in the NDS data suggest that there could
be signiﬁcant beneﬁts from using a call auction to:
1. Open the market for trading
2. Close the market to calculate the “closing price” based on which
mark-to-market valuations of bond portfolios can be done, as well
as a more robust estimation of the term structure of interest rates.
3. The design of the auction can be more speciﬁcally structured to
suit the needs of institutional traders. This will particularly be
14Currently, intra-day price and liquidity information suggest that the market sees lowest
activity on average between 12 and 1.
41important when deciding the desired disclosure of the auction or-
der book.
5.4 Operationalising the call auction
In the above section, we looked at four instances when call auctions could
be used to improve the quality of the equity markets in India. Each of these
instances have diﬀerent motivations for why a call auction might succeed in
delivering better market outcomes than the continuous market in place now.
This requires that diﬀerent aspects of the auction design needs emphasis in
each instance.
However, as described in Section 5, each of the design parameters have mul-
tiples choices, each of which might have diﬀerent implications depending
upon what the primary factor dominating the market, or who the dominant
participants might be in the market at that time.
International experience guides us that even after careful thought is given to
the selection of the parameter choice, exchanges could go through multiple
iterations before they ﬁnd the optimal value. The process of operationalisa-
tion of call auction in the market should include (a) constant evaluation of
the market outcomes once the auction is in place, and (b) the ﬂexiblity to
conduct the auction under changed parameter values if market outcomes do
not improve as expected with the parameter values that are in place.
6 Conclusion
The call auction is an alternative price-discovery mechanism that is being
increasingly considered for trading on exchanges. Exchanges use call auc-
tions to improve price discovery where continuous trading have not delivered
desirable market outcomes. Call auctions are used to discover prices at mar-
ket open, market close, as a trading mechanism for illiquid stocks, as well as
during periods of information shocks.
However, their role is relatively small at exchanges today, compared to either
continuous trading or dealer-market/specialist trading system. Part of the
reason is that call auctions can improve market outcomes only when it can
42attract suﬃcient order ﬂow to create a demand-supply schedule, well popu-
lated with information rich orders. This has proved diﬃcult. Furthermore,
the auction price-discovery process is vulnerable to manipulation, since it is
less costly to place orders with misleading price information in the auction
compared to placing orders on the continuous market.
Thus, call auctions need the “right design” to ensure optimal auction partic-
ipation. Key parameters that the design depends upon are:
• The period of the auction.
• The ﬂexibility of the auction to accommodate all kinds of orders, that
contribute directly to price discovery or to maximising traded volumes.
• How the auction price is calculated.
• Frequency and quantity of price and order disclosure to reduce infor-
mation asymmetry for participants.
Stylised facts about the behaviour of intra-day equity volatility and liquidity
in India suggests that the call auction could prove beneﬁcial here as well.
Call auctions could reduce the excessive levels of volatility and high spreads
that Indian equity currently goes through at market open. Auctions may en-
able better price discovery during a market disruption compared to a market
half. Lastly, they are likely to be more eﬀective for price discovery of the large
number of illiquid stocks in India. In each case, we also identify what param-
eters of the auction needs emphasis to enable a successful implementation of
the call auction.
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